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ALAN WATSON & KHALED ABOU EL FADL

Fox Hunting, Pheasant Shooting, and
Comparative Law
When Herbert was gone he sat musing over his fire with
Aby's letter still in his hand. A lawyer has always a sort of
affection for a scoundrel, - such affection as a hunting man
has for a fox. He loves to watch the skill and dodges of the
animal, to study the wiles by which he lives, and to circumvent them by wiles of his own, still more wily. It is his glory
to run the beast down; but then he would not for worlds run
him down, except in conformity with certain laws, fixed by
old custom for the guidance of men in such sports. And the
two-legged vermin is adapted for pursuit as is the fox with
four legs. He is an unclean animal, leaving a scent upon his
trail, which the nose of your acute law hound can pick out
over almost any ground. And the more wily the beast is, the
longer he can run, the more trouble he can give in the pursuit,
the longer he can stand up before a pack of legal hounds, the
better does the forensic sportsman love and value him. There
are foxes of so excellent a nature, so keen in their dodges, so
perfect in their cunning, so skillful in evasion, that a sportsman cannot find it in his heart to push them to their destruction unless the field be very large so that many eyes are
looking on. And the feeling is I think the same with lawyers.
Anthony Trollope, Castle Richmond (1860), chapter 39.
In the final appendix to his book, The Spirit of Roman Law1' Alan
Watson, perhaps incautiously, drew a short analogy between the art
of pheasant shooters in the U.K. and the art of the Roman jurists.
Both are pastimes that are treated as important adjuncts of gentlemen. The Roman jurist as a gentleman in a slave-owning society
where most work was despised had to fill in his day somehow. 2 For
historical reasons, interpretation of law had come to be one important
is Ernest P. Rogers Professor of Law and Research Professor, University of Georgia.
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1. The Spirit of Roman Law (1995), at 206f.
2. Spirit, at 34ff., especially 38f.
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mark of a gentleman. Skill in interpretation by the rules they themselves developed brought the approbation of their fellows, and social
prestige. For the Roman jurists, skill in interpretation was what
counted. They were otherwise not much interested in law: not in winning court battles, not in devising court tricks and dodges, not in systematizing the law, not in law reform, not even in making the law the
most practical and suitable for the society as a whole or for their section of it. For them there was no honor in that.
Olivia Robinson suggested to Watson that a better analogy than
pheasant shooting would have been with fox hunting. Hence the quotation from Trollope. Trollope's hero at this point is a practicing attorney, very different from a jurist. But the jurist, too, sitting in his
study, has the excitement of the chase, hunting for the interpretation
that will stand up best, that can be fitted to various circumstances,
and that will win the approval of his fellow jurists. The right solution
to the legal problem is for him the fox. For the importance of fox
hunting for a certain group of English society in the nineteenth cen3
tury a cursory reading of Trollope is enough.
Kenneth Pennington takes Watson to task for his picture of the
Roman jurists. 4 Professor Pennington writes:
Watson argues in his book that jurists can create a sophisticated legal system without looking beyond their own
law. Law, he seems to argue, can be created by generations
of subtle minds working out legal problems by using logic
and elegant arguments that convince the profession. I do
not believe that Roman jurists resembled Watson's, although
I would concede that brilliant law can sometimes evolve in
splendid isolation, cut off from outside influences and even
separated from the needs and norms of society. But only occasionally. Most often law evolves under the sway of a myriad of influences. This truth is the best argument for
5
studying legal history.
This rather exaggerates Watson's view of the autonomy of law. And
he sticks to his position. Watson has never argued (and never would)
that the jurists were unaware of social, political and economic realities. They were, after all, men of the world: in the republic many
sought (successfully) high public elected office; in the empire many
3. One short quotation from Orley Farm (1860-61) will suffice:
Foxes are vermin as well as rats, as Perry [a young gentleman keen on ratcatching] in his wickedness had remarked; but a young man who can break
an old one's heart by a predilectionfor rat-catching may win it as absolutely
and irretrievablyby prowess after a fox. (chapter 14).
4. "The Spirit of Legal History," 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1097 (1997). He appears irritated by the analogy with pheasant shooters.
5. Spirit, at 1112.
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were top imperial legal bureaucrats.6 His claim was that typically
the jurists refrained from using social, political and economic realities as an argument for their legal opinion; that often their reasoning
was highly abstract, remote in appearance from these realities, and
with a life of its own.7 Not only that, but Watson suggests that the
Roman jurists were not unique in their approach. It corresponds to a
pattern found elsewhere, in rabbinic law for instance and also in Islamic law.
The essentials for the pattern to come into existence are a system
where:
(1) Law is created primarily by jurists, not by legislation or by
judges.
(2) In their capacity as jurists, these individuals are largely independent of government, not state employees. Indeed, they operate
outside of the state system.
(3) Their prestige, which is fundamental for their role, is independent of any job that they hold. It is determined by the approbation of those interested in those same matters. Pace Professor
Pennington, being a Roman jurist was not a profession: they took no
money for their services.
(4) The materials on which they work are usually older, regarded as authoritative, but are insufficient and require a great deal
of interpretation.
The factors of the pattern are:
(1) The opinions of the jurists are not law. It is their acceptance
that makes law. Thus, there is wide scope for differing opinions.
(2) The opinions give the impression that the jurists are talking
to one another; not, as with judges, to a wider audience; or, as with
legislation, to the public at large.
(3) Jurists often give no reasons for their opinions; or if they did
the reasons are not recorded in our source materials. At times what
gives opinions any authority they have is the reputation of the individual jurist.
(4) They develop a style of reasoning that is most marked by the
kind of arguments they do not use. Thus, they do not much appeal to
utility,8 public usefulness, seldom to fairness or justice.
(5) Many of their decisions and arguments appear to the outsider to be remote from reality. No doubt the jurists are usually
aware of social realities but that awareness often does not appear.
6. For the careers of jurists see, above all, Wolfgang Kunkel, Herkunft und soziale Stellung der r6mischen Juristen (2nd ed. 1967).
7. For a chapter in Spirit, specifically devoted to the jurists struggling with realities at the expense of legal principle see 98ff.
8. Pace Pennington, Spirit, at 1113.
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They are so immersed in their own technique that they give opinions
that to outsiders look absurd, at times callous.
(6) So involved are they with their techniques that they discuss
at length issues that the outsider would regard as trivial. They also
discuss situations that we can scarcely imagine would ever arise. In
this regard jurist-made law diverges greatly from judge-made law.
Judges' discussions concern live situations, and at the level at which
the judges make law the situations are not trivial.
(7) In appearance at least, the jurists are not much interested in
law reform.
(8) They seldom show interest in making the law systematic.
(9) The success of a jurist's opinions is often posthumous, even
when social conditions have changed.
As with the analogy of pheasant shooters and Roman jurists, the
parallels are not complete in the legal systems that are here adduced.
Above all, Roman law is a secular, and rabbinic and Islamic law are
religious systems. And religious law is a search for fundamental
truth.9 Still, a common pattern does emerge.
RABBINIC LAW

10

The work that will concern us in this section will be the Mishnah,
the main source of rabbinic law in its most formative days, and which
was compiled around 220 A.D. It is above all a compilation of the
opinions of earlier rabbis. It is admitted on all sides that it presents a
one-sided view of the Judaism of the period, but that is not our concern. Our business is with it as a law book or book of laws giving the
viewpoint and attitude of the rabbis.1 1 A statement of Jacob Neusner
is very relevant:
Falling into the hands of someone who has never seen this
document before, the Mishnah must cause puzzlement.
From the first line to the last, discourse takes up questions
internal to a system that is never introduced. The Mishnah
provides information without establishing context. It
presents disputes about facts hardly urgent outside a circle
of faceless disputants. Consequently, we start with the impression that we join a conversation already long under way
about topics we can never grasp anyhow. Even though the
language is our own, the substance is not. We shall feel as if
we are in a transit lounge at a distant airport. We understand the words people say, but we are baffled by their
9. Still, the jurists had their origin in the College of Pontiffs; Watson, Spirit, at
34ff.

10. For what follows on rabbinic law we are much indebted to Steven F. Friedell.
11. See, e.g., Shaye J.D. Cohen, "Judaism to the Mishnah: 135-220 C.E.," in
Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism, Hershel Shanks (ed.) (1992), 195ff.
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meanings and concerns, above all, by the urgency in their
voices: What are you telling me? Why must I know it? Who
12
cares if I do not?
At the beginning we will set out some texts to show the approach
of the rabbis. We will choose first examples from the tractate Shabbat ("The Sabbath") to illustrate the richness of the material. God
had ordered that no work should be done on the Sabbath:
Exodus 20.8. Remember the sabbath day, and keep it holy.
9. Six days you shall labor and do your work. 10. But the
seventh day is a sabbath to the Lord your God; you shall not
do any work - you, your son or your daughter, your male or
female slave, your livestock, or the alien resident in your
towns. 11. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth,
the sea, and all that is in them, but rested the seventh day;
therefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day and consecrated
it.
Deuteronomy 5.12. Observe the sabbath day and keep it
holy, as the Lord your God commanded you. 13. Six days
you shall labor and do all your work. 14. But the seventh
day is a sabbath to the Lord your God; you shall not do any
work - you, or your son or your daughter, or your male or
female slave, or your ox or your donkey, or any of your livestock, or the resident alien in your towns, so that your male
and female slave may rest as well as you. 15. Remember
that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and the Lord your
God brought you out of there with a mighty hand and an
outstretched arm; therefore the Lord your God commanded
you to keep the sabbath day.
But God failed to say what work was. The rabbis had to resort to
interpretation. Thus we have in M. Shabbat 7.2:
A. The generative categories of acts of labor [prohibited
on the Sabbath] are forty less one:
B. (1) he who sows, (2) ploughs, (3) reaps, (4) binds
sheaves, (5) threshes, (6) winnows, (7) selects [fit from unfit
produce or crops], (8) grinds, (9) sifts, (10) kneads, (11)
bakes;
C. (12) he who shears wool, (13) washes it, (14) beats it,
(15) dyes it;
D. (16) spins, (17) weaves,
E. (18) makes two loops, (19) weaves two threads, (20)
separates two threads;
F. (21) ties, (22) unties,
12. The Mishnah xiii (1988).
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G. (23) sews two stitches, (24) tears in order to sew two
stitches;
H. (25) he who traps a deer, (26) slaughters it, (27) flays
it, (28) salts it, (29) cures its hide, (30) scrapes it, and (31)
cuts it up;
I. (32) he who writes two letters, (33) erases two letters
in order to write two letters;
J. (34) he who builds, (35) tears down;
K. (36) he who puts out a fire, (37) kindles a fire;
L. (38) he who hits with a hammer; (39) he who transports an object from one domain to another M. lo, these are the forty generative acts of labor less
13
one.
We start with this text primarily because it shows the scope there
often is for interpretation in a system where jurists are the prime
law-makers. But, despite its importance, the text is for us only a beginning in understanding the prohibitions against work on the Sabbath. After all, what is "reaping?" - which is not defined. Was
plucking a few heads of grain "reaping?"1 4 And transporting an object from one domain to another was forbidden, but what counts as an
"object?" The issue is much discussed in the tractate. But if the text
is a beginning - and it can be nothing more - why is it so unsystematically placed so far into the tractate as 7.2? And why is there
such a difference in specificity between one prohibition and another?
"He who sews" appears again as "sews two stitches." Dealing with a
trapped deer merits 7 out of the 39 prohibited clauses. And can an
outsider, even a Jew of the less observant, regard as anything but
trivial the provisions that one may not sew two stitches or tear in
order to sew two stitches? One, but not two? And why is walking
beyond a certain distance not listed here as prohibited?
Our main points with this text are (1) the wide scope available to
jurists - rabbis - for interpretation; (2) a certain lack of systematization; (3) the appearance to outsiders of some degree of triviality; (4)
a sense to the outsider of some arbitrariness. We have, however, produced the text as a backdrop to a few others. Thus, M. Shabbat 1.1:
A. [Acts of] transporting objects from one domain to another [which violate] the Sabbath
(1) are two, which [indeed] are four [for one who is]
inside,
13. The translation like all others here from the Mishnah is that of Jacob
Neusner, The Mishnah.
14. See Mark 2.23f.; Philo De Vita Mosis 2.22 (not permitted to cut any shoot or
branch, or even a leaf or to pluck any fruit): for later evidence see Jerusalem Talmud
Sabbet 9c. Cf. Hermann L. Strack & Paul Billerbeck, Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch 1, 615ff. (5th ed. 1969).
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(2) and two which are four [for one who is] outside.
B. How so?
I C. [If on the Sabbath] the beggar stands outside and
the householder inside,
D. [and] the beggar stuck his hand inside and put [a
beggar's bowl] into the hand of the householder,
E. or if he took [something] from inside it and brought
it out,
F. the beggar is liable, the householder is exempt.
II G. [If] the householder stuck his hand outside and put
[something] into the hand of the beggar,
H. or if he took [something] from it and brought it
inside.
I. The householder is liable, and the beggar is exempt.
III J. [If] the beggar stuck his hand inside, and the householder took [something] from it,
K. or if [the householder] put something in it and he
[the beggar] removed it,
L. both of them are exempt.
IV M. lIft the householder put his hand outside and the
beggar took [something] from it,
N. or if [the beggar] put something into it and [the
householder] brought it back inside,
0. both of them are exempt.
This we quote because it is the very first text in the tractate. It deals
with a very particular aspect of one of the 39 prohibitions of working
on the Sabbath, namely carrying objects from one domain to another.
In a systematic work we would have expected M. Sanhedrin 7.2 to
have been placed at this point, and the present text to appear much
later. To continue with lack of system: the following text M. Shabbat
1.2 deals with a very different subject, behavior shortly before the
afternoon prayer. We are not being unhistorical in pointing out the
lack of systematization: many texts from the ancient world are
systematic.
The text also has the air of being remote from reality. The issue
seems trivial, could scarcely come to court, and not an issue of social
concerns. But clearly it occupied the rabbis in their search for the
rules that were implied in God's law. One should notice the plight of
the beggar: He can scarcely receive alms, even of food, without sinning or causing his donor to sin. He could not receive outside because
of the prohibition against carrying. This, indeed, is probably the context of our text.
M. Shabbat 1.4-8 are concerned specifically with questions that
were a matter of dispute between the School of Shammai and the
School of Hillel, both of which had been founded in the mid-first cen-
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tury. 15 Many others refer to disputes among the scholars. Thus, M.
Shabbat 6.8:
A. "A cripple [lacking a leg] goes forth with his wooden
stump," the words of R. Meir.
B. And R. Yose prohibits it.
C. And if it has a receptacle for pads, it is susceptible to
uncleanness.
D. His kneepads (1) are susceptible to uncleanness imparted by pressure [to something upon which a Zab may lie
or sit], (2) they go forth with them on the Sabbath, and (3)
they go into a courtyard with them.
E. His chair and its pads (1) are susceptible to uncleanness imparted by pressure, (2) they do not go out with them
on the Sabbath, and (3) they do not go in with them into a
courtyard.
F. An artificial arm is insusceptible to uncleanness, and
they do not go out in it.
God had also forbidden the working of animals on the Sabbath, so the
prohibition on going out of the domain with an object also became an
issue with regard to them, and section 5 is devoted to this. Thus, 5.4:
(1) An ass does not go out with its saddle cloth when it is
not tied to him,
B. or with a bell, even though it is plugged,
C. or with the ladder yoke around its neck,
D. or with a strap on its leg.
E. And (2) fowl do not go forth with ribbons or straps on
their legs.
F. And (3) rams do not go forth with a wagon under their
fat tail.
G. And (4) ewes do not go forth protected [with the wood
chip in their nose].
H. And (5) a calf does not go out with its rush yoke.
I. or (6) a cow with a hedgehog skin [tied around the udder], or with a strap between its horns.
J. The cow of R. Eleazar b. Azariah would go out with a
strap between its horns,
K. not with the approval of the sages.
The ribbons and straps on fowls' legs were marks of identification.
Rams' fat tails were highly prized, and the wagon was to protect
them from the ground. The wood chip in ewes' noses was to make
them sneeze and expel worms. The rush yoke was a training device.
15. See, e.g., Lee I.A. Levine in Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism 132 (1992).
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And the hedgehog skin on the cow's udder was to prevent the milk
being drained by other creatures.
In all the texts looked at so far, the acceptability of the ruling
depends on the authority of the jurist. That is quite typical. Presumably at the time the rabbis would give arguments for their opinions.
If so, the arguments have been cut out as not significant. Occasionally, but less frequently a biblical text may be cited as authority, and
further argument given. Thus, M. Shabbat 6.4:
A. A man should not go out with (1) a sword, (2) bow, (3)
shield, (4) club, or (5) spear.
B. And if he went out, he is liable to a sin offering.
C. R. Eliezer says, "They are ornaments for him."
D. And sages say, "They are nothing but ugly,
E. "since it is said, And they shall beat their swords into
plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall
not lift up sword againstnation, neither shall they learn war
any more (Is. 2:4)."
F. A garter is insusceptible to uncleanness, and they go
out in it on the Sabbath.
G. Ankle chains are susceptible to uncleanness, and
they do not go out in them on the Sabbath.
A man could go out wearing his normal clothing, including his habitual adornments. In our text it appears that a garter is permissible,
presumably as a normal adjunct to clothing. No argument, it seems,
needs to be expressly set out. But there was a dispute over a man
going out with a sword or a bow or a shield or a club or a spear. For
Rabbi Eliezer, he could so go out because these items counted as
adornments, and it was permitted to go out wearing one's usual ornaments. The Sages not only gave the opposite ruling but they used a
different approach. They did not (so far as the text goes) discuss
whether these items constituted ornaments or weapons - carrying of
weapons on the Sabbath was forbidden - or the circumstances in
which they constituted one or the other. Instead the Sages cited
Isaiah 2.4. Presumably the argument from that verse was that
swords, spears, and other such implements always had an element of
the improper, so it was irrelevant whether they were adornment on
the Sabbath or not.
From the examples so far adduced, all from M. Shabbat, we see
that the systematics could be weak, conflicting opinions might result
in no clear decision, and that rabbinical opinion, resulting from their
own juristic reasoning could appear to be independent of issues of
social, political or economic benefits. We are, of course, not asserting
that the rabbis were unaware of these issues: only that, as with the
Roman jurists, the tradition of legal interpretation could take precedence. The jurists needed the approval of their fellows.
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Another example of what appears as unsystematic treatment is
M. Gittin ("Bills of Divorce"). It begins (1.1) with the issue of an
agent bringing a bill of divorce from outside Israel to a wife in Israel.
Only in the very last section (9.10) do we learn the grounds of divorce.
The three tractates most seemingly involved with secular concerns or that deal with damages are: M. Baba Qamma ("The First
Gate"), M. Baba Mesia ("the Middle Gate"), and M. Baba Batra ("The
Last Gate"). They show the same approaches as appeared in M.
Shabbat. We will give a few illustrations from Baba Mesia which
treats lost property, guardianship, usury, and the hire of laborers.
The opening text (1.1) (which need not be quoted) is again not concerned with a fundamental issue but with a detail: in court two men
both claim to be the finders of a cloak. How is a decision to be
reached? A common opinion is that the three "Gates" were originally
one unit. In that case, the issue of systematization would be slightly
different, though its lack would still be significant. It would be explicable, but still surprising, that M. Baba Mesia 1.1 appears where it
does. There would seem to be no interest in a rearrangement. Subsequently other issues arise: M. Baba Mesia 3.9:
A. He who deposits a jar with his fellow,
B. and the owner did not specify a place for it,
C. and [someone] moved it and it was broken D. if in the midst of his handling it, it was broken,
E. [and if he moved it to make use of it] for his own
needs, he is liable.
F. [If he moved it] for its needs, he is exempt.
G. If after he had put it down, it was broken.
H. whether he had moved it for his own needs or for its
needs, he is exempt.
I. [If] the owner specified a place for it,
J. and [someone] moved it and it was broken K. whether it was in the midst of his handling it or
whether it was after he had put it down.
L. [if he had moved it] for his own needs, he is liable.
M. [But if he had moved it] for its needs, he is exempt.
The text concerns what in Roman law would be the contract of deposit. But the Mishnah does not use here the technical concept of
fraud which decided liability in Roman law. Nor indeed is negligence
the issue. 16 Instead the rabbis think in terms of various factual situations and determine liability thereby. The depositee could be liable
even without negligence on his part. The practical problem is that
16. Negligence as a concept is either missing or insignificant in rabbinic law.
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this would make it more difficult for someone in time of need 17 to find
someone to look after his goods.
Again M. Baba Mesia 4.11:
A. They do not commingle one sort of produce with another sort of produce,
B. even new and new [produce, plucked in the same
growing season],
C. and it goes without saying, new with old.
D. To be sure, in the case of wine they had permitted
commingling strong with weak,
E. because it improves it.
Presumably the ultimate - we stress ultimate - origin of the basic
rule is the biblical prohibition on the mixing of kinds. Thus, Deuteronomy 22.9ff:
9. You shall not sow your vineyard with a second kind of
seed, or the whole yield will have to be forfeited, both the
crop that you have sown and the yield of the vineyard itself.
10. You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey yoked
together.
11. You shall not wear clothes made of wool and linen
woven together.
Leviticus 19.19.
You shall keep my statutes. You shall not let your animals breed with a different kind; you shall not sow your field
with two kinds of seed; nor shall you put on a garment made
of two different materials.
The biblical prohibition itself could never have been fully applied.
Mules, bred from a mare by a donkey, are a prime example.' 8 And
several Biblical texts show that God's law was often ignored even by
Jacob and the priests. 19 Yet it is here seemingly applied, as if by very
strict reasoning, to a very different situation: the mixing of fruits for
sale. Yet there is a concession to practical utility: strong wine may be
mixed with weak. It is possible, even probable, that the rabbis had a
practical purpose: to prevent fraud by a seller who included not so
good fruit with good fruit. Our text, M. Baba Mesia 4.11, is one of a
series in M. Baba Mesia 4 that is concerned with hindering over17. And, almost by definition, a depositor is someone in time of need.
18. Ezekial 12.14 is no evidence to the contrary, pace e.g., Roland K. Harrison;
The InternationalStandard Bible Encyclopedia 3, Geoffrey W. Bromiley, et a]. (eds.)
(1986), 430. Ezekial is listing Israel's trading partners and includes: "Beth-togarmah
exchanged for your wares horses, war horses, and mules." There is no indication that
the mules were imported because their breeding among Jews was prohibited: that of
horses and war horses, also imported, was not.
19. See Calum Carmichael, The Spirit of Biblical Law 50 (1996).
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reaching. 20 If so, then it is traditional reasoning that inhibits a more
flexible approach.
Our next text relates to the prohibition on usury. God's express
ruling is in Deuteronomy 23.19:
You shall not charge interest on loans to another Israelite, interest on money, interest on provisions, interest on
anything that is lent. 20. On loans to a foreigner you may
charge interest, but on loans to another Israelite you may
not charge interest, so that the Lord your God may bless you
in all your undertakings in the land that you are about to
enter and possess.
Hence M. Baba Mesia 5.2
A. He who lends money to his fellow should not live in
his courtyard for free.
B. Nor should he rent [a place] from him for less [than
the prevailing rate],
C. for that is [tantamount to] usury.
D. One may effect an increase in the rent charge [not
paid in advance], but not the purchase price [not paid in
advance].
E. How so?
F. [I] one rented his courtyard to him and said to him,
"If you pay me now [in advance], lo, it's yours for ten selas a
year,
G. "but if [you pay me] by the month, it's a sela a month"
H. it is permitted.
I. [But if] he sold his field to him and said to him, "If you
pay me the entire sum now, lo, it's yours for a thousand zuz.
J. "But if you pay me at the time of the harvest, it's
twelve maneh [1,200 zuz]," K. it is forbidden.
The whole subject of usury is one of abstruse reasoning. Our main
concern is with the distinctions at the end of the text. If payment for
the lease was either for ten selas per year or one sela per month [i.e.,
twelve selas per year] the lessor was not a usurer, and the bargain
was not prohibited. If by a different arrangement in sale the price
was of a thousand zuz if paid at once, one thousand two hundred zuz
if payment was delayed to harvest time the seller was a usurer and
the transaction was prohibited. But in practical, moral, social and
economic terms there is not any real difference. More than that, from
a different standpoint we can have very different results for the first
20. See the interpretation in Rosh.4.23; Shulhan Anukh Hoshen Mishpat 228.10.
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transaction. In it the lessor receives the twelve month rent - now
set at ten - in advance, and has the use of the money for a year. In
practical terms he has the practical advantages of a usurer. The only
difference is that in money he receives less. In fact, as the text stands
the basic arrangement would be for payment for a year in advance.
But in a sense the lessee is even more a usurer. If he takes the basic
agreement he pays ten selas, and the two not to be paid look suspiciously like interest on the money paid in advance.
Then, still on usury, we may look at M. Baba Mesia 5.9:
A. A man should not say to his fellow, "Lend me a kor of
wheat, and I'll pay you back [a kor of wheat] at threshing
time."
B. But he says to him, "Lend it to me until my son comes
[bringing me wheat],"
C. or, ". . . until I find the key."
D. Hillel prohibits [even this procedure].
E. And so does Hillel say, "A woman should not lend a
loaf of bread to her girl friend unless she states its value in
money.
F. "For the price of wheat may go up, and the two women will turn out to be involved in a transaction of usury,"
Our main interest is in the loan of a loaf of bread. The issue for an
outsider is essentially trivial. The idea of legal proceedings is out of
the question. Moreover, the situation would never arise. No woman
lending a loaf to a woman friend would state its value in money.
That is beyond the boundary of friendship. Even more than that, Hillel bases his absolute prohibition on a possibility: the price of wheat
might go up. 2 1 There are no social or moral values in Hillel's approach. And the relationship of the ruling to the original prohibitions
22
on usury are remote in the extreme.
We now turn to an example from the very different rules of God
on foraging, in Deuteronomy 23.24f.
If you go into your neighbor's vineyard, you may eat your fill
of grapes, as many as you wish, but you shall not put any in
a container. 25. If you go into your neighbor's standing
grain, you may pluck the ears with your hand, but you shall
not put a sickle to your neighbor's standing grain.
Again the rabbis' extensive interpretation is in line with previous examples that we have produced. Thus M. Baba Mesia 7.2:
A. And these [have the right to] eat [the produce on
which they work] by [right accorded to them in] the Torah:
21. What if it went down?
22. M. Baba Mesia 5.10 could equally be used in this connection.
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B. he who works on what is as yet unplucked [may eat
from the produce] at the end of the time of processing;
C. [and he who works] on plucked produce [may eat
from the produce] before processing is done;
D. [in both instances solely] in regard to what grows
from the ground.
E. But these do not [have the right to] eat [the produce
on which they labor] by [right accorded to them in] the
Torah:
F. he who works on what is as yet unplucked, before the
end of the time of processing;
G. [and he who works] on plucked produce after the
processing is done,
H. [in both instances solely] in regard to what does not
grow from the ground.
7.3 A. [IfU one was working with his hands but not with his
feet,
B. with his feet but not with his hands,
C. even [carrying] with his shoulder,
D. lo, he [has the right to] eat [the produce on which he
is working].
E. R. Yose b. R. Judah says, "[He may eat the produce
on which he is working] only if he works with both his hands
and his feet."
7.4 A. [If the laborer] was working on figs, he [has] not [got
the right to] eat grapes.
B. [If he was working] on grapes, he [has] not [got the
right to] eat figs.
C. But [he does have the right to] refrain [from eating]
until he gets to the best produce and then [to exercise his
right to] eat.
D. And in all instances they have said [that he may eat
from the produce on which he is laboring] only in the time of
work.
E. But on grounds of restoring lost property to the
owner, they have said [in addition]:
F. Workers [have the right to] eat as they go from furrow to furrow [even though they do not then work],
G. and when they are coming back from the press [so
saving time for the employer];
H. and in the case of an ass [nibbling on straw in its
load], when it is being unloaded.
The rabbis have limited the law about travelers to laborers in the
field. This caused further exhaustive interpretation. Thus, for instance the laborer could eat the produce on which he had worked at
the time of processing. If he worked on grapes he could not eat figs,
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but he can hold his hunger till he comes to the best grapes. He can
eat in this way only when actually working, but this includes the
23
time spent in going from furrow to furrow. This is a fringe benefit.
In the light of what we have said above, no further commentary by us
is needed.
One further topic, and only one part of it, needs discussion,
namely the treatment of pledge debtors. God's rules are set out in
Deuteronomy 24.6-17. Part of verse 17 reads: "You shall not take a
widow's garments in pledge." This is treated in part of M. Baba Mesia 9.13: "From a widow, rich or poor, they do not take a pledge."
From the wording of Deuteronomy "widow's garments" are interpreted as meaning any property of widows. Such extensive interpretation of a legal provision is common in many societies. But the
practical social and economic consequence of the interpretation, not
obviously implicit in Deuteronomy, is that it will be much harder for
a widow, even a wealthy widow to obtain a loan.
Medieval rabbis and Jewish community leaders understood the
impracticality of much of the law in the Mishnah. The Rashba (R.
Solomon ben Abraham Adret who lived in Barcelona around 12351310) wrote in a responsum that if cases of personal injuries and similar matters were decided according to Torah law, the world would be
destroyed. 2 4 Subsequently the Ran (Rabbi Nissim ben Reuben Gerondi who lived circa 1310-1375) accepted that some Gentile societies
had law better suited than the Torah to the social order. For him the
Torah law is designed to serve a religious purpose, not to improve the
25
social order.
RoMAN

LAW

No one, we believe, will conclude from the preceding section that
we are critical of the rabbis' stance. Indeed, the aim is to show that it
belongs to an overrarching pattern. No one, we hope but with less
optimism, will imagine that we think the rabbis were unaware of
political, economic and social considerations. Only, these are not
stressed. Our real claim is that the rabbis focused on interpretation
according to their own canons. Of course, religion was there as the
foundation, but often the situation discussed is so far distant from
the circumstances of the biblical law that the connection can scarcely
be seen.
When we come now to development by jurists of Roman law, and
wish to claim a pattern with development of rabbinic law we must
23. See B. Bava Mezia 85b. Professor Friedell calls to our attention Rabbi
Menahem Meiri's (1249-1316) comment: "The learned based on tradition that this
matter only applies to a hired worker. If not so, how would he have permission to
enter."
24. Responsa Rashba 3.393.
25. Derashot.
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insist that a similar pattern does not mean identity. To avoid misunderstandings we list at the outset factors which constitute real differences between the juristic development of rabbinic law and of Roman
law.
First, rabbinic law is religious, Roman law is secular. Accordingly, rabbis will be more concerned with minute details and with
what appears to outsiders as trivia than will Roman jurists. 26 Second, the ultimate source of rabbinic law was the Torah. But after this
there was no or little 27 subsequent legislation nor any other source of
law but learned interpretation. At Rome, though after the Twelve
Tables of the mid-fifth century legislation was always uncommon, it
continued until the emperor Claudius (41-54). In addition, law was
in effect made by the Edicts of the praetors - the high elected officials who controlled the courts - until the time of Hadrian (117-138).
Further, senatus consulta, decrees of the senate, came to have the
force of law; and there could always be rulings of various kinds on law
by the emperors. So, for the jurists, there could be more modern "official" law that could cut down the scope of interpretation.
Third, there was no official way in rabbinic law to settle what the
law was. Things were rather different at Rome when Augustus gave
the ius respondendi. Gaius writes of it:28
The answers of the learned are the decisions and opinions of
those who are authorized to lay down the law. If the decisions of all of them agree, what they do hold has the force of
lex, but if they disagree, the judge is at liberty to follow
whichever decision he pleases. This is declared by a rescript
of the late emperor Hadrian.
The exact nature of this right which appears also - in a rather different form - in D.1.2.2.49, is disputed but that need not concern us
here. 29 The ius respondendi so long as it lasted - not all that long would still not restrict the power of interpretation. And in many situations what the law was would remain uncertain.
Fourth, the jurists, but not the rabbis, were concerned with interpreting the law of the state which always had ultimate control.
That control, though, was often not used.
Fifth, the leading Roman jurists were involved in public life,
though not in their capacity as jurists. Many that we know of in the
republic were consuls or praetors or pontiffs. 30 Many in the empire
26. For the importance of emphasis on trivia in law see Alan Watson, Ancient
Law and Modern Understanding(1998), 71ff.
27. There is for example the notorious chauvinistic measures of the synod of Hillelites and Shammaites of 65 or 66: M. Niddah 4.1; Babylonian Talmud Shabbat 16b.
28. G.1.7.
29. For one view see Alan Watson, Sources of Law, Legal Change, and Ambiguity
6ff. (2d ed. 1998).
30. See above all the details in Kunkel, Herkunft.
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were imperial bureaucrats including the great Ulpian, Paul, and
Papinian. But we emphasize that in their writings as jurists they
were not functionaries. Rabbinical scholars were in different case,
Certainly some of those cited in the Mishnah served as Presidents of
the Rabbinical Council or Sanhedrin:3 1 Hillel the Elder, Simeon ben
Gamaliel I, Gamaliel II, Simeon ben Gamalliel II, Judah the Patriarch, and Gamaliel III, but that was the result of being a rabbi. Of
these, only Gamaliel II, Simeon ben Gamalliel II, and Judah the Patriarch are cited frequently.
Sixth, as a result of past history, the interest of Roman jurists
centered on what we would call private law. This last point demands
further explanation which will also be important subsequently for
our understanding of this section. The ancient Twelve Tables resulted from a conflict for legal equality between the plebeians and the
patricians: the latter had a monopoly of state offices. In the result the
codification was a victory for the patricians who included in the code
only those rules they were willing to share with plebeians. Thus, no
public law or sacred law. The Twelve Tables contain to the greatest
extent private law. The patricians then gave a monopoly of interpretation to the College of Pontiffs, the most important religious body,
and it appointed one of its number each year to interpret the code.
Hence, it became important for Romans who wished to rise high in
public office to be skilled in interpreting the law. But only interpretation. And at that, interpretation of private law. It is this concentration on private law and its separation from public and religious law
that makes Roman law look so different from Rabbinic and Islamic
law. 32
When we come now specifically to the work of the Roman jurists,
our first topic must be the lack of systematization. On this we will
say very little. Systematization is notoriously bad as set out in Justinian's Digest and Code, and we would be simply repeating what
Watson has already written in The Spirit of Roman Law. It is
enough to recommend the reader to look at the books and titles of the
Digest as they are set out in the table of contents of that work. The
great 19th century German scholar, Theodor Mommsen, wrote "Diese
Ordnung oder Unordnung ist die des julianischen Edicts."3 3 ("This
order or disorder is that of the Julianic Edict.") And the Edict had
grown up piecemeal, and haphazardly. 34 The great work of the
rightly celebrated French jurist, Jean Domat (1625-1696), is properly
entitled Les Loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel ("The Civil Laws in
their Natural Order"). This is largely an attempt to set out French
31.
32.
33.
34.

See Herbert Danby, The Mishnah 799f. (1933).
For details, see Watson, Spirit, 33ff., 44ff.
JuristischeSchriften 1, 164 (1905).
See, above all, Otto Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum (3rd. ed. 1927).

HeinOnline -- 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 17 2000

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 48

law with a Roman law base. But the very title, as indeed the book
itself, shows his dissatisfaction with the Roman arrangement. In the
following century, his famous compatriot, Robert Joseph Pothier
(1699-1772) produced an edition of the Digest, his PandectaeJustinianae. In this, although the books and titles remain unchanged, the
texts within each title are moved around in an attempt to make each
topic more comprehensible. So far as we are aware, no one has ever
praised the arrangement of the Digest. We stress this lack of systematization which is endemic in Roman juristic writing because it is
precisely jurists, qua jurists, who have the best possibility of making
law systematic. Judges, faced with one case after another, cannot do
it. In fact, one Roman jurist, only one, Gaius, produced a system, and
that has come to dominate modem codified law. But he was treated
as so unimportant that "Gaius" is the only part of his name that we
know, his system was not followed by other Roman jurists, who refer
to him only once-and even that reference is doubted. 35 The great,
powerful subsequent jurists, Ulpian, Paul, Papinian and others, continued on their merry way with little systematization. This we see in
the huge, separate commentaries on edictal law and civil law of Ulpian and Paul, when there was only one court system!
On jurists' interest in reform we can say little, because there was
little. The best evidence for that proposition is Justinian's Quinquagintae Decisiones, "The Fifty Decisions." These imperial rulings
were issued after the promulgation of the first Code and some apparently even after the beginning of work on the Digest,36 the compendium and abridgement of juristic writings. They are an attempt to
give a precise answer to problems that had confronted classical jurists but were not solved by them. Yet from the emperor Augustus
onwards, most of the famous jurists were top civil servants. Any of
them could have solved any of these issues by an imperial ruling. But
they were not interested. One example may stand for all. The
Twelve Tables of the mid-fifth century B.C. distinguished manifest
theft from non-manifest theft, but it did not explain what each was.
Hence, there was scope among the jurists for disagreement. Thus,
Gaius, writing in the mid-second century can write at G. 3.184f.:
Manifest theft, according to some, is theft detected whilst being committed. Others extend it to theft detected in the
place where it is committed, holding, for example, that a
theft of olives committed in an olive-grove, or of grapes committed in a vineyard, is manifest if detected whilst the thief
is still in the olive-grove or vineyard, or, where there is theft
in a house, whilst the thief is still in the house. Others, go35. See, e.g., Watson, Spirit, at 201ff.
36. See, e.g., W.W. Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law 46 (3d ed. by P. Stein
1963).
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ing further, have maintained that a theft remains manifest
up to when the thief has carried the thing to the place he
intended. And others go so far as to say that it is manifest if
the thief is seen at any time with the thing in his hands.
This last opinion has not been accepted, nor does the opinion
that the theft is manifest if detected before the thief has carried the thing to where he intended, seem to be approved,
because it raises a considerable doubt as to whether this is to
be limited to one day or extends to several, the point being
that thieves often intend to carry off what they have stolen
to another town or province. Either of the first two opinions
is tenable, but the second is generally preferred.
The position was not clarified even in the time of Justinian almost
four centuries later. Thus, D.47.2.3:
A thief is manifest whom the Greeks describe as 'c
a6TToppW, that is, one caught in the act of theft. 1. And it
makes little difference whether he be caught by the owner of
the thing or by someone else. 2. But is a thief manifest only
if he be caught in the act or also if he be apprehended elsewhere? The better view is that which appears in the writings of Julian, that is to say, that although he be not taken
at the scene of the offense, he will still be a manifest thief if
he be taken with the stolen thing, before he has taken it to
its intended destination.
D.47.2.4."Destination," for this purpose, means "the place
where he aimed to remain that day with the stolen thing."
D.47.2.5. Consequently, whether he be apprehended in a
public place or in a private one, before he gets the thing to its
intended resting place, he is in such a case that he will be a
manifest thief, if caught with the stolen goods; so wrote Cassius. 1. But if he should have reached his destination, then,
although he later be found with his booty, he will not be a
manifest thief.
But the matter was important for the penalty. The manifest thief
was condemned to pay four times the value of what was stolen, the
non-manifest thief only double. Nor can it be claimed that the distinction was meaningless because thieves usually have no money.
Many Roman thieves would be slaves, and then it would be their
owner who had to pay the penalty.
Professor Pennington misleadingly tells us. "But we do know
that the jurists retained their status for centuries, altering their
opinions on the basis of justice (equitas)and utility (utilitas), not just
elegant argument." 3 7 Alas, not so. Of course, jurists disagreed 37. Spirit, at 1113.
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what, otherwise is the interest? - and offered different approaches.
But reform, in the sense of making "better," or "more socially beneficial" law? Let us take the case of utility (utilitas).
The word utilitas is frequent in the Digest.38 But only eight texts
report that a juristic ruling is propter utilitatem, "on account of utility." And these texts divide into three classes. First, two texts relate
that some rule "has been accepted on the ground of utility."39 That is,
the jurist writing the text is not himself arguing for a proposition on
the ground of utility. Second, two texts record that a view is generally held on the ground of utility. 40 Again, the jurist is not arguing
his own view on the ground of utility. Only four show in any way a
41
jurist arguing for his own proposition "on the ground of utility."
One text next records that favore utilitatis,"for the benefit of utility,"
a proposition was adduced - again usefulness is not the argument of
the writer of the text. Utilitatis causa, "on account of usefulness,"
occurs only fourteen times in the Digest. Of these thirteen relate that
a rule was accepted or is accepted or a remedy was introduced on the
ground of utility. 42 Not one of these thirteen shows jurists arguing or
"altering their opinions on the basis of . . . utility." One text,
D.46.3.95.7, relates that Labeo and Pegasus thought a ruling should
be accepted on the ground of utility. Whether they used utility as an
argument or whether the writer of the text, Papinian, is attributing
that argument to them is not entirely clear. Five texts have utilitatis
gratia, "in the interest of utility." Four of these report this as the
reason that influenced the jurist.4 3 No other Digest text is relevant to
the present discussion.
What the texts show is first that the jurists could be aware that a
remedy was introduced or a rule adduced on the ground of utility.
Who would ever doubt that? Second, and more importantly for us,
they show that utility was not an argument that a jurist would produce to bolster his own opinion. It was not the kind of argument that
would appeal to his fellow jurists. What we hope we have shown with
44
regard to utilitas applies equally to aequitas.
Our claim, of course, has never been that the Roman jurists were
unaware of social reality: 45 only that, like the rabbis, they not infrequently gave precedence to elegant, legalistic argument, preferring a
38. See Vocabularium JurisprudentiaeRomanae 5 (1903), 1592ff.
39. D.41.2.40.1; 46.6.6.
40. D.41.4.2.9; 43.3.1.3.
41. D.11.7.43; 14.3.17.2; 19.5.17.2; 20.1.12.
42. D.17.2.26pr.; 29.2.68; 33.1.10.3; 40.7.2.4; 41.2.1.14; 41.2.32.2; 41.2.44.1;
41.4.2.9; 41.4.2.16; 43.1.2.1; 43.9.1.1; 45.1.4.2; 45.1.115.2.
43. D.13.5.5.9; 26.4.5.2; 35.3.3.10; 40.9.1. The remaining text is D.2.12.7.
44. When Papinian in D.17.2.81.2 says he interprets a pact ex aequitate,the same
solution would follow from basic legal reasoning.
45. See, e.g., Alan Watson, Legal Origins and Legal Change 11ff. (1991); Spirit,
98ff.
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"fine" solution to a socially practical one. And that they did not concern themselves much with what happened in court. We want to give
a few examples of this approach, which is not too dissimilar from
what we also find among the rabbis.
As a first example we choose the one instance known to us where
a jurist, the great Quintus Mucius Scaevola (consul 95 B.C.), appeared in court. The case, the famous causa Curiana,involved the
interpretation of a will that read "Let my son be my heir. If my son
dies before reaching puberty, let M.' Curius be my heir. '46 Quintus
Mucius argued for a literal interpretation. M.' Curius was to be heir
only on condition that the testator's son died before reaching puberty.
But the testator never had a son therefore, argued Quintus Mucius,
the condition failed, and Curius could not be heir. The reality of the
testator's intention is defeated. And Scaevola's opponent, an orator
not a jurist, won. Again when a testator provided "Let Cornelius and
Maevius, whichever of them wishes, be my heir" and both wanted to
be heir, (D.28.5.70(69)), Trebatius (circa 84 B.C. - A.D. 4) held that
neither was to be heir. A more general failure of the jurists relates to
the interpretation of the Twelve Tables' rules on intestate succession.
The heirs were in order: first, sui heredes, that is, persons in the
power of the deceased who became free from paternal power on his
death; second, the agnatus proximus, the nearest agnate; third, the
gentiles, members of the clan. 4 7 "The nearest agnate" was inter-

preted as that nearest agnate at the time the intestate died. If he
himself died before accepting the inheritance, or if he refused it, the
inheritance did not go to the next nearest agnate, but straight to the
48
whole gens.
A further example from succession is in D.30.63 (Celsus, book 17
of Digest):
If the testator bequeathed all his female slaves and their offspring and one has died, Servius denies that her offspring is
owed, because this was bequeathed by way of addition. I
hold this to be false. This opinion accords with neither the
words nor the wishes of the deceased.
No commentary on the artificial position of Servius is needed. 49 A
particularly instructive text is D.18.1.1.1:
All buying and selling has its origin in exchange or barter.
For there was once a time when no such thing as money existed and no such terms as "merchandise" and "price" were
46. The main sources are Cicero, de oratore 1.39.180; 2.32.43; de inventione
2.42.122; Brutus 52.194ff; topica 10.42; pro Caecina 1853.

47. XII Tab. 5.4f.
48. For details see Alan Watson, The Law of Succession in the Later Roman Republic 176ff. (1974).

49. A further example from Servius could be adduced from D.50.16.122.
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known; rather did every man barter what was useless to him
for that which was useful, according to the exigencies of his
current needs; for it often happens that what one man has in
plenty another lacks. But since it did not always and easily
happen that when you had something which I wanted, I, for
my part, had something that you were willing to accept, a
material was selected which, being given a stable value by
the state, avoided the problems of barter by providing a constant medium of exchange. That material, struck in due
form by the mint, demonstrates its utility and title not by its
substance as such but by its quantity, so that no longer are
the things exchanged both called wares but one of them is
termed the price. And today it is a matter for doubt whether
one can talk of sale when no money passes, as when I give an
outer garment to receive a tunic; Sabinus and Cassius hold
such an exchange to be a sale, but Nerva and Proculus maintain that it is barter, not sale. Sabinus invokes as authority
Homer who, in the lines which follow, relates that the army
of the Greeks bought wine with bronze, iron, and slaves:
"Then the long-haired Achaeans bought themselves wine,
some with bronze (xaAKW), 50 others with splendrous iron, oxhides, oxen themselves, or slaves." These lines, however,
suggest barter not purchase, as also do the following: "And
now Jupiter, son of Saturn, so deranged the mind of Glaucus
that he exchanged his armor with Diomedes, son of Tydeus."
Sabinus would have found more support for his view in what
this poet says elsewhere: "They bought with their possessions." Still the view of Nerva and Proculus is the sounder
one; for it is one thing to sell, another to buy; one person
again is vendor and the other, purchaser; and, in the same
way, the price is one thing, the object of sale, another; but, in
exchange, one cannot discern which party is vendor and
which, purchaser.
The second Homeric text has been cut short, and should conclude
"gold for bronze (Xa)KW)." The point at issue between the Sabinians
and the Proculians was a serious one. The rules for the contract of
sale were relatively satisfactory, those for barter were not. The
Sabinians, in this instance aware of realities, wished to include barter in sale: both parties could be regarded as buyers. But they could
not use an argument from utility. Instead they produced an argument from Homer - no authority, but they could find no other where the purchase of wine for money, XaKy, was equated with its
50. The translation as "copper" in The Digest of Justinian (2d ed. 1988), by Alan
Watson is inexact. The usual meaning of XaAK, in Homer is "bronze" which alone
makes sense here: Cf. H.G. Liddell & R. Scott, Greek English Lexicon 1974 (rev. 1996).
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purchase for oxen, slaves and so on. The Proculians, more concerned
with legal purity, responded with another quotation from Homer.
The Sabinians, they claimed, mistranslated Xc q, which means not
"money" but simply "bronze." The Proculians prevailed. 5 1
Examples could be multiplied, but at this stage I would like to
offer a few from book two of the famous textbook, the Institutes of
Gaius, written around 161.52 Thus, G.2.196:

Only things belonging to the testator by Quiritary title can
properly be legated by vindication. In the case of things
reckoned by weight, number, or measure, such as wine, oil,
corn, and money, it is held to be sufficient if they belong to
the testator by Quiritary title at the time of his death. But
all other things, it is held, are required to belong to him by
Quiritary title at both times, namely that of his making the
will and that of his death; otherwise the legacy is void.
"Quiritary title" means "at civil law." The second sentence of the text
is formalistic in the extreme. The explanation is that the early will,
the testamentum per aes et libram, involved the ceremony of
mancipatio, a formal method of transferring ownership of important
objects, and it conferred full civil law ownership at once. The doctrine, illogically but sensibly, was not originally applied in cases of
succession: the recipient in the mancipatiodid not become owner, and
the named heir became owner of the inheritance only on the testator's death. Still, one consequence from archaic times was that in a
legacy of the type called per vindicationem - where the legatee
claimed as being already owner - only specific objects fully owned by
the testator both at the making of his will and at his death went to
the legatee. 5 3 Again, there is G.2.238:
A legacy to an uncertain person is void. A person is considered uncertain of whom the testator had no certain conception, as where the legacy runs: 'To the first person who
comes to my funeral let my heir pay 10,000 sesterces.' The
law is the same if the legacy be to all in general 'whosoever
shall come to my funeral'. In the same case is a legacy left
thus: 'Let my heir pay 10,000 sesterces to whoever gives his
daughter in marriage to my son.' Also, a legacy 'to the first
persons designated consuls after the making of this will' is
equally considered to be to uncertain persons. And in short
there are many other cases of this kind. But a legacy to an
uncertain person of a defined class is valid, for instance: 'To
51. See above all, David Daube, "The Three Quotations from Homer," in
D.18.1.1.1.' now in David Daube, Collected Studies in Roman Law 341ff. (1991).
52. Cf. Francis de Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius 2 (1953) at 5.
53. For details of the archaic testamentum per aes at libram see Alan Watson,
Rome of the XII Tables: Persons and Property 61ff. (1975).
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that one of my kindred now living who is the first to come to
my funeral let my heir pay 10,000 sesterces.'
The principle makes sense. But its application in the specific examples given by Gaius does not. Common sense would indicate that the
principle should have been expressed so as to include within it the
first examples given by Gaius.
Again, G.2.244:
It is a question whether we can validly legate to one who is
in the potestas (power) of him whom we are instituting heir.
Servius holds that the legacy is valid, but that it is avoided
if, at the time when the legacies vest, the legatee is still in
potestas, and that therefore the legacy is due alike if it be
unconditional and the legatee cease in the testator's lifetime
to be in the heir's potestas, or if it be conditional and the
same happen before the condition is fulfilled. Sabinus and
Cassius hold such a legacy to be valid if conditional but invalid if unconditional, arguing that though it is possible that
the legatee may cease during the testator's lifetime to be in
the postestas of the heir, the legacy must nevertheless be
considered void, for the reason that it would be absurd that
what would be invalid if the testator died immediately after
the execution of the will should be valid just because he had
a longer span of years. The authorities of the other school
hold the legacy invalid even if conditional, on the ground
that we can no more be conditionally debtors of those in our
postestas than we can unconditionally.
The reasoning is that a person in potestate, in paternal power, can
own nothing, and anything he acquires goes to his paterfamilias. The
opinion of the old republican jurist, Servius (died 43 B.C.)5 4 seems
sensible but imperial successors, Sabinus and Cassius, defeated the
testator's intention, and even more so did the Proculians, the rivals of
55
the other school.
As is to be expected from a secular system there is less discussion
of what appears to outsiders to be trivial situations. After all, secular
law is not law as absolute truth. Still, such discussion is not lacking.
For us, the most interesting examples are in D.33.9., a whole title of
the Digest dedicated to legacies of "stores," penus. Such legacies seem
to have been common. A fine discussion is in D.33.9.3 from the jurist
Ulpian:
1. But Aristo notes that things which are not for eating and
drinking are also included in the legacy, as, for instance,
those things in which we are accustomed to eat things, such
54. Cf. Kunkel, Herkunft 25.
55. For other examples from Gaius, see, e.g., G.3.176; 3.179; 3.198.
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25

as oil, fish sauce, brine, honey, and other similar items. 2.
Admittedly, he says, if edible stores are legated, Labeo
writes in the ninth book of his Posthumous Works that none
of these things goes with the legacy, because we are accustomed not to eat these things but to eat other things by
means of them. In the case of honey, Trebatius states the
opposite, rightly, because we are accustomed to eat honey.
But Proculus correctly writes that all these things are included, unless the testator's intention should appear otherwise. 3. Did he legate as eatables those things which we are
accustomed to eat or also those things by means of which we
eat other things? The latter should also be considered to be
included in the legacy, unless the intention of the head of the
household is shown to be otherwise. Certainly, honey always goes with edible stores, and not even Labeo denied that
fish too, along with their brine, are included.
Aristo's ruling in fr. 1 that things not for eating or drinking but by
which one eats or drinks, such as oil, fish sauce, brine, or honey, are
included in the legacy of stores is surrealistic. Not so much the ruling
as the very discussion. If the legacy is of olives, who is going to dispute whether the brine in which they are preserved is included? But
the discussion then becomes fantastical in fr. 2. Aristo observes, apparently with approval, that if the legacy was not simply of "stores,"
but specifically of "foodstores," then Labeo was of the opinion that
such things were not included. And Labeo (who died between A.D. 10
and 21) is one of the most respected jurists.5 6 But the issue was live
even before: Trebatius (who probably died shortly after A.D. 4) would
include honey (used in preserving fruits) in a legacy of "edible stores"
because "we are accustomed to eat honey." And Aristo agrees. But
then he goes on to agree with Proculus - the famous head of the
Proculian school of jurists, active in the first century A.D. 5 7 - that
all such things would be included in the legacy unless it appeared
that the testator thought otherwise. In fr. 3 Ulpian furthers the
explanation.
In fact, the Roman jurists seem seldom to discuss actual factual
situations. Very few such instances can be determined. Hypothetical
situations were so much the rule that we have a text, D.3.5.29 (30),
that begins "Ex facto quaerebatur,""A problem from real life." Such
an opening is unthinkable if it were not that jurists habitually discussed hypothetical issues.
A type of discussion of trivia from another angle occurs when the
subject matter is valuable but the legal institution would scarcely exist in practice. Central to the earliest Roman consensual partnership
56. Cf. Kunkel, Herkunft 114.
57. Cf. Kunkel, Herkunft 123ff.
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was the societas omnium bonorum, a partnership of all the assets. 58
This derived from the non-contractual ercto non cito which occurred
when persons subject to the deceased's power became independent on
his death, that is, primarily the children of the deceased. When they
were in potestate they owned nothing hence the partnership was automatically of all their assets. The consensual partnership of all one's
assets would not be a mercantile contract, except just possibly between brothers. It would be entered into when brothers or possibly
very close friends operated a farm together. With the growth of Rome
it seems very likely that it would become an extremely rare institution. Issues would very seldom arise in practice. Still, legal problems
could be envisaged that could never arise from lesser partnerships. A
prime example would be where the partners agreed that if a daughter
of one partner married the dowry would come from the partnership
funds. And a dowry from such a father could come from nowhere
else! Thus, the provision of a dowry to the daughter of one partner
was a charge on all the partners. Again, if one partner married, any
dowry he received would be part of the partnership assets. The legal
problems fascinated the jurists of the empire.
Thus, the jurist, Paul (active in the early third century)5 9 held
that if a married partner was still married when the partnership
ended, he would take the dowry (i.e. before the other assets were divided) since he was responsible for the expenses of the marriage. If
on the other hand, the marriage was ended before the partnership,
the husband who had to repay the dowry (traditionally in three annual payments) could take in advance of the other partners only on
the day that each payment fell due. 60 Still, Gaius active around the
middle of the second century)6 1 tells us that if at the moment of dissolution of the partnership it is certain that not all of the dowry has to
62
be returned the judge ought to divide it between the partners.
As often, the great Papinian (executed in 212)63 discusses the
most sophisticated issues. 6 4 We will treat only one of these. A partner promised a dowry for his daughter, but died before payment. The
marriage ended in divorce and the wife successfully sued her ex-husband for a formal release of the dotal obligation. When she brought
the partnership action, could she take in advance from the partner58. See e.g., Franz Wieacker, Societas. Hausgemeinschaft und Erwerbsgesellschaft (1936); "Das Gesellschaftsverhiiltnis des klassischen Rechts," 69 Zeitschrift der
Savigny-Stiftung 302ff. (rom. Abt.) (1952); Watson, "Consensual Societas between Romans and the Introduction of the Formulae," now in Alan Watson, Legal Origins and
Legal Change 175ff. (1991).
59. Cf. Kunkel, Herkunft, 244f.
60. D.17.2.65.16.
61. Cf. Kunkel, Herkunft, 186ff.
62. D.17.2.66.
63. Cf. Kunkel, Herkunft, 224.
64. D. 17.2.81.
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ship assets the amount of the dowry? The answer was yes, because
the agreement to pay dowries from the partnership was not unfair,
especially if the wording was fitting for the daughters of both partners. It was irrelevant that only one partner had a daughter. 6 5
Three great imperial jurists, Gaius, Papinian and Ulpian, avidly discussed the issues that could arise from a legal institution whose practical reality scarcely existed.
Finally in this section we would like to look once again at the
horrifying senatus consultum Silanianum of A.D. 10. Among similar
provisions it primarily declares that when a slave owner is murdered
at home all the slaves who lived under the same roof are to be subjected to torture and then put to death. To the best of our knowledge
this is the one important part of Roman slave law that was not accepted elsewhere. What is appalling is that the Roman jurists interpreted it as they did any other piece of law making. 66 So ordinary did
they consider it that they discuss it in the context of succession. After
all, the murder of the master opened up his inheritance. Thus,
D.29.4 is headed, "Where someone, passing over a will, takes possession of an inheritance on intestacy or in some other way." Our title is
D.29.5, and significantly is entitled "The senatus consultum Silanianum and the senatus consultum Claudianum:those whose will may
not be opened." The will of the murdered master was not to be
opened until the slaves were executed in case he had freed some in
his will. They would have become free and citizens at his death,
hence could not be executed without trial, but they are treated as
slaves! The next Digest title, D.29.6 is "If a person has prohibited
someone from making a will or has compelled him to make one."
Watson's point in the past has been that, horrifyingly, the jurists interpreted this decree according to their usual canons even when they
contradicted the obvious purpose of the senatus consultum: to make
slaves responsible for the safety of the owner. Thus, in The Spirit of
Roman Law he concentrated on extreme instances where the senatus
consultum was not applied. 67 Professor Pennington, who has taken
his knowledge of the senatus consultum from The Spirit of Roman
Law, and not from the original sources, suggests that the subsequent
interpretation may have been intended to restrict the scope. 68 Alas,
no. There certainly was interpretation that restricted the scope, but
equally there was wide interpretation. Thus, an owner included
someone who had given his slave in pledge, 69 or an heir from whom a
slave was given as a legacy subject to a condition (even if the condition was fulfilled after the murder of this heir-owner), or even if the
65. D.17.2.81pr.
66. See already, Alan Watson, Roman Slave Law 134ff. (1987); Spirit, 165ff.
67. Spirit, 165ff.
68. Spirit, 100f.

69. D.29.5.1.3.
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slave was to become free under a condition from the previous testator . 0 One who had only a share in a slave was also owner. 7 1 Chil72
dren of the slave owner were owners for the purpose of the decree.
And so it goes on. Ulpian held that the decree applied to an adopted
son, but not to one given in adoption. 73 It has to be remembered that
at Rome adoption was a political act, and was not for the protection
of infants. The son, given in adoption, who was murdered, but not
covered by the senatus consultum, was living with his biological
father!
ISLAMIC LAW

Joseph Schacht has commented that Islamic law represents an
extreme case of a "jurists' law."7 4 Schacht meant that Islamic law
was shaped and developed by jurists who, for the most part, were not
supported by the state. Schacht was also alluding to the highly formalistic and theoretical nature of Islamic law. According to Schacht
Islamic law was developed by jurists employing casuistic methods of
thinking, and who were disconnected from reality and practice. 7 5
Therefore, Schacht concluded that Islamic law is not law at all but
76
represented a unique phenomenon of juristic science.
There is little doubt that Schacht is wrong. Several scholars
have effectively refuted Schacht on historical grounds and theoretical
grounds. 77 Schacht ignored the fact that Islamic law was the product
of a complex interaction between judges (qadis), jurisconsults (muftis) and the state. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick and
David Powers provide a helpful explanation as to various actors that
helped shape Islamic law:
An important division of juristic labor marks the relation of
the Shari'a, or Islamic law, to the concrete world of human
affairs. Across time and space, two distinct categories of
legal interpreters have stood at the meeting points of law
and fact. The domain of legal procedure, including adversarial cases rules of evidence, binding judgments, and state
enforcement, belongs to the judge (qddf); the issuance of
70. D.29.5.1.4.
71. D.29.5.1.6.
72. D.29.5.1.7.
73. D.29.5.1.9.
74. Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law 5, 209 (1984).
75. Introduction, 205.
76. Introduction, 200.
77. For example see Hallaq, "The Logic of Legal Reasoning in Religious and NonReligious Cultures: The Case of Islamic Law and the Common Law," 34 Cleveland
State L. Rev. 79ff. (1985-86); "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?," 16 Int'l J. of Middle
East Studies 3ff. (1984). Also see Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim
Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to
the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries," 1 Islamic Law and Society 141ff. (1994).
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nonbinding advisory opinions (fatdwd, or fatwds) to an individual questioner (mustaftf), whether in connection with litigation or not, is the separate domain of the jurisconsult
(muftT). In their different venues, both qadis and muftis
have specialized in handling the everyday traffic in conflicts
and questions falling within the purview of the Shari'a.
Compared to qadis, muftis have received little attention
in Western scholarship, in part because of the litigation-oriented expectations of many observers for whom the role of
the jurisconsult is unfamiliar, and in part because, in many
historical settings, the activity of the mufti was far less institutionalized than that of the qadi. Whereas qadis always
were appointed, salaried officials who dispensed justice in
public tribunals, many muftis operated privately and unobtrusively without any ties to the political authorities, while
others were officially appointed. The significance of the work
of the muftis -

whether private or public -

rests on the

high degree of authority that could be carried by their opinions, which represent the closest Islamic equivalent to the
familiar Anglo-American legal mechanism of case law
78
precedent.
Islamic law is the product of a complex dynamic between juristic
opinions elicited by theory and material considerations. This points
out another way in which Schacht was wrong. What Schacht described as a unique phenomenon in jurisprudence is not unique at all.
Islamic law, like Roman and Jewish law, whether it dealt with material or theoretical issues, developed within a technical juristic culture
with its own set of symbols and professional practices. In this culture
jurists talked to jurists and the art of the trade was practiced for its
own sake. Again, we emphasize that this did not mean that Muslim
jurists were unaware of social realities or that they had no interest in
such realities. It does mean that Muslim jurists, like other jurists,
often engaged in the "hunt" for the most technically sound or correct
answer, and that in doing so their primary fidelity was to the inherited practices of the juristic culture and not necessarily to social, ethical or political considerations. As such, Muslim jurists understood
and responded to material considerations through the prism of the
legal culture, and quite often the legal culture imposed its own distinct reality. For jurists the hunt is not simply a sport; it is their
profession and life.
What Jacob Neusner said about Jewish law certainly holds true
for Islamic law. Muslim jurists often take up questions that are internal to the system of jurisprudence under which they labored. The
78. Mohammed Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick & David S. Powers, Islamic
Legal Interpretation f. (1996).
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discourses go on regarding questions that hardly seem urgent to outsiders and when we join 'the conversation of jurists we feel that we
are joining a conversation long under way about topics that seem distant and obscure. Muslim jurists show little interest in explaining
the context or in demonstrating the relevance of their discussions. It
is as if one joins a debate between mathematicians who speak in an
inaccessible language and who are not interested in explaining the
relevance of their discussions to outsiders.
It bears emphasis that our point is not that Muslim jurists failed
to respond to social or political realities. Our point is that the technique of the jurist often imposes its own logic and structure, and that
Muslim jurists, like their Roman and Jewish counterparts, were
often more interested in technical soundness and demonstrations of
prowess than in the impact of certain decisions or social results. This
is not because these jurists were oblivious to the social realities that
surrounded them, but because legal culture imposes its own overwhelming reality.
Examples of technical distinctions that seem to make sense only
within the specific culture of jurists are numerous. In these examples
reality is firmly situated and understood from within the prism of
legal culture. The law is the law not because it makes good sense or
because of its desired social impact but because it is the product of
the inherited legal culture. For instance, in the Shafi'i legal manual
of Ahmad Ibn Naqib al-Misri (d. 769/1368) the author addresses
which words uttered by a husband will effect a divorce. He explains
that plain words will effect a divorce whether one intends a divorce by
them or not but allusive words require a specific intent to divorce.
Ibn Naqib states:
When the husband says, 'I divorce you,' or 'You are divorced,'
the wife is divorced whether he has made the intention or
not.. .Using allusive words to effect a divorce includes: the
husband saying, 'You are now alone,' you are free,' 'You are
separated,' 'You are parted,' You are no longer lawful to me,'
'Rejoin your kin,' 'You are footloose,' and the like; or if he
says, "I am divorced from you,' or when he commissions his
wife to pronounce the divorce, and she says, 'You are divorced'; or when someone asks, 'Do you have a wife?' and he
says 'No' or when the husband writes words that effect the
divorce no matter whether he is able or unable to speak at
the time of writing or whether he is present or absent, or
whether he writes in plain or allusive words. When one intends divorce by any of the above, the words effect it, but if
one does not, they do not. But when a husband is asked,
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then she is
'Have you divorced your wife?' And he says, 'Yes,'
79
divorce.
a
intend
not
does
he
if
even
divorced
It is not clear why saying "I am divorced from you," or commissioning
ones wife to pronounce the divorce is considered allusive, while an
affirmative response to "have you divorced your wife" is considered
plain. It is also not clear why a writing is always considered allusive.
These distinctions had little to do with social practices in the 8 th/ 1 4 th
century, but were the product of inherited distinctions developed in
the specific legal culture. They make sense by reference to the practice of the juristic culture and not by reference to a social practice.
Often juristic discourse will reflect fidelity to consistency of doctrine and not necessarily to perceived understandings of social practices. For instance, the Prophet is reported to have declared that a
triple divorce, as opposed to a single repudiation, is a particularly
reprehensible form of divorce. 8 0 Therefore, the Maliki jurist Sidi
Khalil (d. 776/1374) in his influential legal manual states that a repudiation is considered triple if the husband declares, "You are repudiated by the most disgraceful, the worst, the dirtiest, the most hateful
repudiation." A repudiation is only single where a husband says,
"You are repudiated by the best repudiation" or "by an only and excellent repudiation."8 1 These formulas could hardly reflect social practices or understandings; it is unlikely that a husband would have
told his wife that she is repudiated by an only and excellent repudiation. The important point, however, is that the frame of reference for
the law is not social practice but consistency within the legal culture.
As background for the next example it should be noted that Muslims pray relatively long prayers five times a day, but they may
shorten their prayers if they are traveling. The reason for this law is
to alleviate hardship upon the traveler. Nevertheless, the Hanafi jurist Abu Bakr al-Haddad (d. 800/1397) states the following:
The intended destination is taken into account when the
traveler makes his decision to travel. The stipulation of the
intended destination is that the person says he is headed for
such and such a place, but not that he is just going because
he might go about the whole earth and not intend a particular place. Even though the distance between where he goes

79. Ahmad Ibn Naqib al-Misri, 'Umdat al-Salik 559f (trans. Noah Ha Mim Keller 1991).
80. Under Islamic law a man and woman may marry and divorce up to three
times without an intervening marriage. A triple divorce counts as three divorces on
one occasion. The partners may not re-marry without the woman marrying a different man first.
81. F.H. Ruxton, Maliki Law: Mukhtasar of Siki Khalil 128 (1916).
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and where he started is a trip of three days, he does not
82
qualify as a traveler.
The rational behind the distinction of intending a specific place or
traveling to an unknown destination does not seem to be socially
based. The distinction, however, is based on the established practice
in the Hanafi school of law. Early Hanafi precedents established that
a legal license requires the formation of a specific intent and that doctrine persisted.
Frequently, a rule becomes firmly established but the original
reasoning behind a rule is not preserved or recalled. Nevertheless,
fidelity to the legal culture will preserve the rule and will result in
efforts to explain its existence. For instance, the inherited Hanafi
doctrine is that it is reprehensible to place baked bricks or wood on a
gravesite but reeds are acceptable. Consequently, al-Haddad states:
It is said that baked brick is reprehensible only because it is
made with fire and is therefore not auspicious. Therefore,
rock and wood is not reprehensible. In the Hidayah it says
that this determination of the principle is not sound. If fire
is used in baking bricks, it is not the basis for the principle
behind the reprehensibility because if it is customary to
wash the corpse in hot water, fire was already used.
Al-Sarakhsi says the consideration in determining the
principle is that it is said on account of the prohibition of
building because that is what is in common between the
baked brick and wood, for wood does not require the use of
fire.
The Bukharis say baked brick is not reprehensible in
our cities on account of it touching the corpse because of the
ground's weakness so that Muhammad b. al-Fadl says if the
coffin had been made of iron he sees no harm in it in this
area. But it is appropriate to place an adobe brick on that
which is touching the corpse.
Al-Timirtashi says baked brick is reprehensible only
when it is touching the corpse. When it is on top of an adobe
brick, it is not reprehensible, because it preserves the corpse
from predatory animals and protects it from excavation.8 3
Although the Bukharis and Muhammad Ali al-Timritashi (d. 1004/
1595) accommodate the social practices within their context but they
do so within the technical requirements of the inherited doctrine,
and, hence, the requirement of adobe bricks under the baked bricks.
Frequently, however, the rules are based on abstract hypotheticals that are unconnected to social imperatives. For instance, Khalil
82. Abu Bakr b. Ali al-Haddad, JawharatAl-Nayyirah 1, 246 (1301) cited in and
translated by Brannon W. Wheeler, Applying the Canon in Islam 190 (1996).
83. Al-Haddad, pp. 132f. cited in and translated by Wheeler, 200f.
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states that a conditional repudiation will immediately take effect if it
has been made subject to a condition concerning some past fact. For
example, if a husband says, "I swear by my wife's repudiation, that if
I had gone to Zayd yesterday, I would have killed him" the repudiation takes place immediately. Likewise, a repudiation shall immediately take effect if it is made conditional upon a future occurrence, at
which, in all probability both parties will be present. For example, if
a husband says, "You are divorced on the day of my death." The same
holds true if the repudiation is made subject to a condition that is
unknown to people or on an event undeterminable in the present.
For instance, if a husband says, "You are repudiated if it pleases God"
or "You are divorced if you become pregnant." Repudiation is also
obligatory and immediate if it is made subject to a negative condition
implying an unlawful act. For example, "You are divorced if I do not
commit adultery." However if the husband says, "You are repudiated
on the day Zayd arrives" or "You are repudiated if Zayd does not arrive." The repudiation is not immediate.8 4 The distinction between
the examples of immediate and non-immediate divorces are not based
on social demands or needs. They are based on hypothetical and abstract constructs, and on an accepted symbolic discourse within the
legal culture.
The abstract reasoning developed in the legal culture will often
invoke highly improbable situations that sometimes border on the absurd. For instance, Muslim jurists often discuss the consequences if a
husband tells his wife, "You are repudiated by a quarter", "half' or
"one-third a repudiation", or if a husband tells his wife, "You are repudiated one repudiation plus another," or "plus one half a repudiation," or if the husband tells his wife, "I divorce only one half of you"
or "I divorce you three times minus three times."8 5
Muslim jurists engaged in these hypotheticals partly to demonstrate the full range of the applicability of a rule. But, in addition,
these abstractions demonstrated the competence of the jurist and his
ability to find technically sound solutions to rather improbable
situations.
The following example is from Ibn al-Muqri's 'Umdat al-Salik:
If the husband says, 'You are divorced if God does not will it'
she [the wife] is not divorced... If the husband says, 'If I divorce you it is as if I divorced you three times earlier,' it
counts as one divorce... If the husband, tells his wife, 'If you
enter that house, you are divorced,' but then she is subsequently divorced from him with a finalized divorce, after

84. Khalil, 130.
85. Khalil, 129; Ibn Muqri, 560.
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which he remarries her, and she then enters the house, then
86
she is not divorced.
In another example, Abd Allah Ibn Hanbal (d. 290/903) the son of
the founder of the Hanbali school of law, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 241/
855), reports the following exchange:
I asked my father about a man who says to his wife, 'You are
divorced if I do not have intercourse with you today and you
are divorced if I perform my ablutions after [having had intercourse with] you today.' My father said, 'He may pray the
afternoon prayer, then have intercourse with her, and when
the sun goes down, he may perform his ablutions, as long as
he did not mean by his statement if I perform my ablutions
87
[specifically after having had] intercourse.'
Ibn Hanbal's response is technically correct, but it is also detached
and objective and shows no interest in any social reality or
implications.
Jurists do not only remove themselves from social realities by
focusing on the technicalities and mechanics of law, but they will also
assume that social behavior will conform to the mechanics of legal
technique. As noted earlier, legal culture often acts as a prism
through which the jurists' social understandings and expectations
are formed. Jurists will often interpret the world through the lens
imposed by the habit and practice of legal technique. Therefore, jurists will form understandings of concepts such as "causation" or
"reasonableness" or characterize social tendencies but such understandings or characterizations are often a projection of legal technique. This often results in conceptualizations of social tendencies
that seem rather odd, and these conceptualizations then become the
basis for further rule making which is projected upon social practices.
For example, the Hanafi jurist Ibn Umar al-Dabusi (d. 430/1038)
states the following:
When something predominates in the existence of things, it
becomes the precedent even if it is not found [there in all
cases] like regarding the sleeper as having become impure
from having sexual intercourse [during the night] because it
[having sex] is predominate for people in this state and thus
the sleeper is considered to have been affected even if he was
not [in actuality]88

86. Ibn Muqri, 560ff.
87. Susan A. Spectorsky, (trans.), Chapters on Marriageand Divorce: Responses
of Ibn Hanbal and ibn Rahwayn 126f. (1993).
88. Ali b. Umar al-Dabusi, Ta'sis al-Nazar (1320), cited in and translated by
Wheeler, 148.
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Elsewhere, al-Dabusi explains the position of Abu Hanifa, the
founder of the Hanafi school of law, regarding a special form of prayer
performed when one is afraid of harm:
If a person prays on a boat, and is afraid for himself [that he
might fall off], and so motions with his head [instead of bowing and prostrating], his prayer is permitted according to
Abu Hanifah because the motioning of the head predominates on boats and so this becomes his legal state even if it
was not the case [that he was afraid of falling off].89
It is very likely that Abu Hanifa and al-Dabusi understood that
not all people who are sleeping have had sex, and that not everyone
on a boat is afraid of standing, bowing and prostrating on a boat.
Furthermore, in all probability the personal experiences of these jurists confirmed the falsity of these assumptions regarding social practices. However this knowledge is largely irrelevant. What is relevant
is the integrity of the legal method and the process by which these
rules were produced.
Juristic fidelity to legal method and doctrine will often tenaciously preserve certain rules regardless of the evolving social circumstances. Therefore, one will find that within certain schools of
thought specific legal doctrines will consistently survive, often for
centuries at a time, regardless of whether these rules serve a social
purpose or not. For instance, around the 3 rd/ 9 th century the Hanafi
school of thought developed the idea that a divorce obtained under
duress is enforceable. Furthermore, the Hanafi school, contrary to
other Islamic schools, adopted the notion that Islamic law's jurisdiction is territorial. The Hanafi's also adopted the atypical view that
those who rebel against the government are iniquitous and sinners.
The duress and jurisdictional rule was incessantly repeated by
Hanafi jurists for twelve hundred years. The rule concerning rebels
survived as accepted doctrine in the Hanafi school for about four hundred years. Around the 6 th/ 1 2 th the specific rule regarding rebels was
modified by some Hanafi jurists in a slow and gradual process. 90 The
persistence of legal doctrine is not only due to the impact of precedent
on the legal mind. At times, certain inherited legal doctrines become
part of the symbolic universe that identifies and distinguishes certain
legal cultures. Abandoning or even questioning such legal doctrines
would be seen by fellow jurists as unorthodox and, perhaps, as a form
of heresy. It takes considerable creativity and bravery on the part of
a jurist to challenge the established assumptions of a legal culture,
89. Wheeler, 148.
90. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, "The Islamic Law of Rebellion: The Rise and Development of the Juristic Discourses on Insurrection, Insurgency and Brigandage,"
(Ph.D. dissertation, 1999).
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and yet continue to identify oneself as a jurist from within the challenged tradition.
CONCLUSIONS

The Roman jurists, ancient rabbis and Muslim jurists were very
different people. Above all, the rabbis and Muslim jurists were engaged on a search for law as truth. And the Roman jurists were much
more obviously upper-class gentlemen.9 1 But the similarities are
great. All three had a passion for legal interpretation. They delighted in discussing hypothetical cases. They chased after solutions
by ways of reasoning devised by themselves. Practical utility, while
present, was in the background. At times, to outsiders, their opinions
seem outr6, even callous, remote from reality. They have little interest in what actually happens in court: their texts do not smell of the
courtroom even when they invent new devices. They do not seek to
devise a system of law. Nor do they propose radical reform. They
write for those interested in the same issues as themselves.
It may be suggested that the picture we have drawn is more appropriate to rabbis and Muslim jurists than to Roman jurists, to a
search for truth rather than a commitment to social reality, but then
the early history of Roman law must be brought into play. After the
code of the Twelve Tables was promulgated in the middle of the fifth
century B.C. a monopoly of interpretation was granted to the College
of Pontiffs, the main state priestly body. And the Pontiffs chose one
of their members each year to interpret this law. The main task of
the Pontiffs was to preserve the right relations between the gods and
the state or the leaders of the state. And their approach to this was
that appropriate to the interpretation of religious law. Certain types
of argument such as utility, fairness or economic advantage could not
be expressed. And, naturally enough, the Pontiffs applied this approach to their interpretation of the Twelve Tables.92
Law is a conservative discipline. And when the Pontiffs lost the
monopoly of interpretation, the jurists, their successors, continued
the approach. This continued, of course with some modifications, to
the end of the classical period of Roman law, traditionally dated
around A.D. 235. The Mishnah and Shari'a were intended to be studied for their own sake. So, we believe, were the writings of the Roman jurists.
Subsequently in changed circumstances in Western Europe there
are fewer signs of jurists being remote from reality. This may be we speculate - because law for them was not a hobby but a business,
primarily in teaching and in consultation in actual disputes. Still,
91. We use that term to avoid being more precise.
92. See for more detail, Alan Watson, The State, Law and Religion: PaganRome
63ff. (1992).
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the legalistic, formalistic approach continued. Indeed, the approach
was so prevalent in Western Europe that it is really superfluous to
93
produce examples.

93. But we should like to adduce two illustrations, both extreme, and of different
kinds.
First, one from the great medieval jurist, Azo of Bologna (c. 1150 - 1230). A beginning student, Bernardus Dorna, used a verse of the Latin poet Ovid as an argument. Azo objected: Non licet allegare nisi Iustinianileges, "It is not permitted to cite
except the laws of Justinian:" Questiones 10, Scholaris quidam, in Quaestiones de Azo,
Ernest Landsberg (ed.) 74 (1888). This is, of course, even more legalistic than some of
the texts that we have seen from Roman jurists. Homer could be cited at Rome.
The second example is from modern law, the French code civil of 1804, art. 4,
which in effect prohibits the citation of any authority except statute law. Of course,
judges are aware of judicial precedent, juristic opinion and societal conditions, but the
fact that these cannot be cited has consequences.
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